

CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY FMD VACCINATION PLAN

This is a draft document focusing on foot-and-mouth disease vaccination strategy and logistics in the state of California and is subject to change. This document does not represent national policy nor any policy of the California Department of Food and Agriculture. This document is for planning purposes only and is constantly evolving as new information becomes available.

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FOREWORD

This section is under development

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

Purpose of the Plan

The goal of the emergency vaccination campaign is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible animals by rapidly vaccinating a high proportion (≥85%) of the atrisk population. The selected vaccination strategy will dictate the subsequent disposition of vaccinated animals, which could be to depopulate, slaughter, allow to live out their useful lives, or any combination of these.

The use of emergency vaccination to respond to an FMD outbreak within this state will be determined by the state and/or tribal Animal Health Official (SAHO), the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator, and the Unified Command, and guided by this plan.

The purpose of this plan is:

- to provide a process for the SAHO, the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator, and the Unified Command (UC) to rapidly consider and select alternative strategies using emergency vaccination when it becomes apparent in an FMD response that stamping out alone will not achieve control, containment, and ultimate eradication of FMD;
- to define the purpose and strategy of the state's emergency vaccination campaign with the goals of eradicating FMD, regaining freedom from disease status, and returning the United States (U.S.) livestock industry to normal production as rapidly as possible;
- to outline the operational plan of the emergency vaccination campaign so that incident managers are prepared to control vaccine cold chain and accountability, distribution for rapidly administering doses to target populations of animals, and maintain traceability of vaccinates; and
- to assist the Unified Command and SAHO in determining vaccine needs and provide a process for requesting appropriate quantities of vaccine from the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator.
- to provide a process for the Unified Command, State Veterinarian, and the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator to rapidly consider and select alternative strategies using emergency vaccination when it becomes apparent in an FMD response that stamping out alone will not achieve control, containment, and ultimately eradication of FMD;

This plan is not intended to guide a long-term or routine vaccination campaign for widespread, national FMD infection.

The California State Emergency Plan has an Emergency Support Function #11 (ESF 11) Food and Agriculture Annex which describes the CDFA's responsibilities to respond

to a FAD outbreak. This plan is an addendum to the ESF 11 Annex, and it presents the concept of operations for the state to implement an emergency vaccination program when there is a presumptive or confirmed positive case of FMD in North America or an imminent threat of FMD to California livestock populations.

Situation

This Section provides an overview of the plan assumptions and planning consideration for emergency vaccination for an FMD response.

Assumptions

- Any outbreak of FMD in North America would trigger at least minimal activation of the California FAD Response (monitoring through active surveillance, tracing, coordination with industry to increase biosecurity/activate Secure Food Supply Plans, controlled movement).
- Many other response elements will be activated simultaneously with the FMD Vaccination activities described in this plan. In addition, with the incursion of FMD, other FAD response activities may be activated prior to activation of this plan.
- This plans assumes the state with use the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage any FAD outbreak response and that a Unified Command Incident Management Team (IMT) would be activated at an Incident Command Post (ICP) with department operation center (DOC) activation in support.
- In the event FMD Vaccine is requested based on an imminent threat, rather than an actual FMD outbreak in the state, the FMD Scientific Coordination Group may be activated simultaneously and possibly just before activation of the IMT.
- Depending on the FMD outbreak type and serotype, it is likely the vaccine will need to be manufactured specifically for the outbreak. This plan assumes a lag of several weeks between the request for vaccine and receipt of finished vaccine for distribution to farms.

Planning Considerations

- The species and types of susceptible animals that will be targeted for vaccination will vary depending on the outbreak situation. In order to understand how emergency vaccination will impact an FMD response effort, it is critical to know the following:
 - \circ How the virus behaves in each species that may be vaccinated;
 - The epidemiology of the situation (to the best knowledge available);
 - At-risk populations; Risk of exposure to the virus;
 - Age of animals and how the production sector works;

- Amount of vaccine that is available to use (both in the short and, if available, longer-term).¹
- Due to high density and concentration of animal populations, California anticipates any outbreak greater than a Type 1 Focal Outbreak² will require the use of vaccine in the California dairy

population. CDFA further anticipates that animals arriving in the state solely for slaughter will not be prioritized for vaccination.

- The CDFA/USDA VS Unified Command (UC) Incident Management Team (IMT) will assess at-risk animal populations and use a matrix/tool containing weighted questions to determine the specific susceptible species and productions within the state which will be the target of the vaccination campaign. This tool is under development. It will be important to collect as much information as possible prior to the outbreak.
- The IMT epidemiologists will formulate the recommended vaccination strategy which may include any single strategy, or a combination of the strategies outlined in the FAD PReP NAHEMS Appendix A Vaccination for Foot-and-Mouth Disease³, to include:
 - Vaccinate to Live animals that are "vaccinated to live" are allowed to live their normal lifespan unless they become infected
 - Vaccinate to Slaughter animals that are "vaccinated to slaughter" are either slaughtered for human food consumption or killed and disposed of by some method. Careful consideration of biosecurity of slaughter facilities to insure contaminated meat is not sent to landfills or other locations where feral wildlife could interface.
 - Emergency Vaccination Emergency vaccination (vaccination in the face of an outbreak) is usually conducted as reactive vaccination to a known strain of virus.
 - Protective Emergency Vaccination Protective emergency vaccination, which is conducted among animals in uninfected areas, creates a zone of animals with reduced susceptibility around the infected area
 - Suppressive Emergency Vaccination Suppressive (or 'damping down') emergency vaccination is conducted in the infected area where the virus is

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/fmd-vacpriority.pdf

² https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak_2013.pdf

https://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/fad-prep-nahems-appendix-a-vaccination-for-foot-and-mouthdisease

already circulating. It is intended to reduce virus transmission, aid control efforts and prevent FMD from spreading beyond the infected zone.

- Targeted Vaccination Targeted vaccination attempts to protect specific groups of animals. Stamping out, as the sole eradication strategy, risks the destruction of rare species, rare breeds and high value genetic stock. Targeted vaccination may be directed at uninfected animals of high value, which can include livestock with particularly valuable, rare or unusual genetic backgrounds, long-lived production animals, zoo animals or endangered species. Targeted vaccination can also be directed at uninfected areas where there is a high density of susceptible animals
- Ring Vaccination Ring vaccination refers to a strategy of immunizing animals within a defined area around infected premises or infected zones. Its purpose is to reduce or prevent virus transmission from a focal outbreak to surrounding uninfected areas. Ring vaccination is most likely to be successful if foci of infection can be identified rapidly, before the virus can spread. It may not be appropriate in cases where the disease is widespread or contained in widely scattered foci, if the disease is difficult to identify, where there is a significant delay between infectivity and case confirmation, or where there is a significant delay between vaccine administration and the onset of protection
- Barrier Vaccination Barrier vaccination is very similar in principle to ring vaccination; however, the vaccination zone is used to prevent the infection from spreading from a neighboring country or region into the uninfected area, rather than to keep it from spreading outward from infected premises. Geographic and political features usually have an important influence on the shape and location of the vaccination zone. Barrier vaccination can be used in an OIE-defined protection zone, in addition to enhanced surveillance and movement controls.
- Predictive Vaccination In predictive vaccination, vaccination is concentrated on farms that are predicted to have the greatest contribution to virus transmission in the future. Models are used to predict the probability that 'first generation' farms will be infected from a given source farm, and the probability that these farms will infect 'second generation' farms. Because first generation farms are likely to be infected before vaccination can take effect; the model suggests that they are not the optimal targets; vaccination should concentrate on farms at risk in the second generation.
- Blanket Vaccination Blanket (mass) vaccination can be conducted throughout an entire country or throughout an OIE-defined zone with a separate status. Countries are most likely to consider blanket vaccination when a disease becomes widespread. This form of vaccination can be carried out indefinitely in countries or zones defined as "FMD free with vaccination"; however, this designation affects trade status.

REQUESTING VACCINE

Process

- The state may choose to assemble a group of personnel with the appropriate authority and FAD response expertise (e.g., a Scientific Coordination Group) to supplement the Unified Command IMT and perform strategic planning necessary for the FMD Vaccination campaign. Activation of this group will enable the other members of the IMT to focus on the immediate response for the current and upcoming operational period and not divert resources from the IMT for these strategic planning activities. The Scientific Coordination Group may be considered the advanced planning "arm" of the IMT or depending on level and role of participants, may be more appropriately considered a MAC Group (comprised of Agency Administrators and policy makers). In either capacity, the group will work closely with the UC IMT. This group will consider specific characteristics of the outbreak and will advise the SAHO whether emergency vaccination is necessary and advisable, and request the development of the corresponding vaccine request. The group may prepare or delegate the preparation of an Emergency FMD Vaccine Authorization and Request. In addition, this group may be responsible for the periodic adjustment of the emergency vaccination plan and may contribute recommendations to the strategy throughout the incident.
- If such a group is used, membership of this group will be flexible and assembled per the needs of the response. The participants of the FMD Scientific Coordination Group may include:
 - 1. CDFA State Vet or designee
 - 2. USDA VS DD or designee
 - 3. CAHFS Lab Director or designee
 - 4. NVSL Lab Director or designee
 - 5. Unified IMT (IC, Planning and Operations)
 - 6. Epidemiologist (State and VS)
 - 7. Emergency Management Advisor(s)
 - 8. Cal OES Agency Representative
 - 9. Law enforcement Representative
 - 10. JIC or Public Information Representative
 - 11. Private Practitioner Representative
 - 12. Industry Representative(s)

Common factors that can trigger the FMD vaccine request are:

- The outbreak involves the state or has expanded beyond a focal area of infection limited to one state or small region
 - The State Vet and USDA VS DD decide to employ vaccination as a control measure
 - The official request for vaccine will be submitted to include:
 - Written vaccination plan
 - Emergency FMD Vaccination Authorization and Request Form
 - Defines species/production type
 - # of doses requested

Resources to rapidly depopulate and appropriately dispose of large numbers of carcasses are not adequate

The cost of implementing a stamping-out (alone) strategy is inordinately high The outbreak occurred in an area with a high density of susceptible animals

- The stamping-out (alone) strategy is causing or is anticipated to cause severe economic losses for producers from the loss of production animals or destruction of genetic stock
- To create or protect an area free from the outbreak and allow for continuing international commerce according to OIE regulations.
- The stamping-out (alone) strategy will cause a lengthier interruption in the food supply chain for key commodities—including milk, meat, and cheese—especially for domestic consumption
- Public perception and political considerations for mass depopulation make it impossible to execute this strategy adequately to effectively control the outbreak

Drafting the request for vaccine:

- 1. FMD Scientific Coordination Group will conduct a rapid situation assessment and provide a recommendation to the State Veterinarian on the use of FMD Vaccine to control the outbreak
- 2. FMD Scientific Coordination Group and Unified Command IMT make recommendations on the initial vaccination strategy(ies)
- 3. Unified Command (UC) IMT rapidly evaluates NASS, ET, EMRS, and collects data from dairy processors statewide to determine impacted commercial premises to estimate number of doses needed.
- 4. Upon concurrence of the State Veterinarian, the IMT or FMD Scientific Coordination Group will prepare the official request for vaccine.

Responsibilities

This section identifies the key personnel or agencies responsible for implementing and supporting emergency FMD vaccine storage, delivery, administration and tracking, from the state NVS warehouse to animals in the field.

FMD State Scientific Coordination Group

- Makes recommendation to the State Vet regarding the decision to request vaccine for use in the state
- Assists UC IMT with recommendation on the initial vaccination strategy
- Assists UC IMT with prioritizing vaccinates
- Advises on the development of the request to vaccinate; reviews the request for vaccine prior to submission to SAHO for final approval
- Evaluates criteria and makes recommendation to SAHO for statewide stop movement order

SAHO

- Notifies the Secretariat and Governor of the FAD incident and pending vaccine request.
- Reviews and approves all vaccine requests prior to submittal to USDA
- Issues a written Delegation of Authority to the UC Incident Commanders
- Activates the FMD Scientific Coordination Group, if needed
- Negotiates with states that would be receiving this state's vaccinates for processing (I.e., swine leaving the state for processing) and with states wanting to send vaccinates into this state
- Notifies and continues industry communication
- Approves vaccination strategy
- Approves establishment of Control Areas
- Approves all euthanasia methods
- Approves all MOUs and requests for inter-agency mutual aid

Unified Area Command

- To be activated when multiple IMTs are activated in separate incidents throughout the state
- Prioritize resource deployments between incidents
- Prioritize and harmonize objectives and strategies amongst incidents
- Ensure Agency Administrator direction from all agencies is carried out within the Unified Command

UC Incident Management Team (IMT)

- Ensure actions align with SAHO Delegation of Authority
- Receives, tracks, inventories, maintains cold chain, distributes and deploys vaccine according to the approved strategy; evaluates and reports on progress and continuously monitors effectiveness of strategy(ies)
- Deploys government and non-government vaccination strike teams to implement its vaccination plan

- Work with the FMD Scientific Coordination Group to make recommendations on the best use of vaccine, with a focus on containment or slowing the spread of disease
- Receives, tracks, and reports information regarding vaccinates during the response.
- Documents, verifies, and reports on the number of vaccine doses received by the IMT and distributed to the field
- Develops the supplemental information for the vaccine request.
- Coordinates with facilities slated for vaccination, in advance of vaccine delivery, to validate head counts and determine if they have personnel and infrastructure that can support the vaccination effort. If they do not, the IMT will locate/request the necessary personnel and equipment (e.g., refrigerated storage).
- Industry Risk Assessment and Mitigation Unit (IRAM), coordinate with industry for biosecurity, vaccination and Secure Food Supply (SFS) plans.

California Office of Emergency Services (State Emergency Management Agency):

- Assist with securely escorting NVS vaccine delivery from state-line to the IMT warehouse (Having a liaison in the Scientific Coordination Group, Cal OES would be aware of the vaccination request as soon as a decision was made to submit such a request.)
- Assists with inter-agency, interstate, and federal agency mutual aid for security for vaccine warehouse and associated distribution, and other response activities

Accredited Veterinarians:


- Helps the producer in the development of a premises-specific <u>FMD</u> <u>Vaccination Herd Management Plan.</u>
- Assists in implementing the state's vaccination strategy.
- Documents, verifies, and reports to the UC IMT the number of vaccine doses delivered to client premises.
- Oversees the end delivery of vaccine to animals, verifying cold chain maintenance, injection, and animal or group tracking/marking. Submits timely reporting to the UC IMT.

Owner of vaccinates:

- Assists with vaccination of the herd; employs on-farm personnel in the vaccination campaign, as available.
- With the assistance of an accredited veterinarian, develops a <u>FMD</u> <u>Vaccination Herd Management Plan¹</u> for vaccinates. This plan will detail how the producer tracks vaccinates, reports natural mortality of vaccinates and the movement, sale, or harvesting of vaccinates to state animal health officials. This information will be reported to the Disease Surveillance Branch during the response and to the day-to-day CDFA AHB permitting staff once the IMT is demobilized.
- Responsible for paying any fees charged by the Accredited Veterinarian not paid by the USDA.

State producer organizations (i.e., Pork Association, Livestock Association, Dairy Cooperatives, etc.):

- Participate in the Industry Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group.
- Work with SAHO to support Controlled Movements
- Assist with developing and implementing plans for business continuity, ensuring biosecurity and safe movement of products from unaffected premises
- Assist with recommending solutions for animal carcass and product disposal
- Work with IMT to identify premises with personnel qualified and available to participate in a vaccination task force/strike teams
- Assist with locating commercial vaccination crews for use during response
- Work with PIOs, likely form a unified Joint Information Center (JIC) to allow PIOs to work together from all responding government agencies and industry



Options for ICS Organization [Double click chart to open larger]

UTILIZATION OF VACCINE

This Section describes the factors important for the state to develop an effective vaccination strategy, as well as the general process for determining vaccination zones and the overarching vaccination strategy. Details should be included to describe how zones will be delineated, approved, announced, and enforced.

Factors

The UC IMT and the FMD Scientific Coordination Group will use the factors listed in Table 1.1 below to evaluate the outbreak situation and make determinations on an appropriate FMD vaccination strategy for the current situation.

Table 1.1. Factors Influencing a Response Strategy or Strategies for U.S. FMD Outbreak- **Modified for California to assess vaccination status. Some questions can be answered generically, pre-event while others are event specific.**

(From FMD Redbook 2014 version)

Factor or criterion supporting the response strategy	USDA Answers Supporting Emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out	California Incident Specific planning (to be completed during outbreak response)
Suitable vaccine for FMD outbreak strain	Available	
Resources for stamping out (such as disposal)	Limited	
Resources for vaccination (such as diagnostic testing, tracing efforts, and permitting activities)	Adequate	
Population density of susceptible animals at high risk of becoming infected	High	
Population density of virus amplifying animals	High	
Movement of infected animals, products, or fomites out of Control Area	Evidence of extensive movement	
Origin of outbreak Location of initial outbreak	Unknown Livestock producing area	
Spread of outbreak Distribution of outbreak	Rapid Widespread	
Risk of infection in valuable, rare, endangered, or high value genetic livestock	Low	

Likelihaad that END sould because	Low	
Likelihood that FMD could become	Low	
prevalent in feral swine, deer, or		
other wildlife	Strong Opposition	
Public acceptance of	Strong Opposition	
stamping-out strategy	Ausilabla	
Surveillance, diagnostic,	Available	
and laboratory resources		
for sero-surveillance after		
vaccination (DIVA)		
Domestic stakeholders'	No	
acceptance of		
regionalization with		
stamping-out or		
vaccination to kill		
Domestic stakeholders'	Yes	
acceptance of		
regionalization with		
vaccination to live or		
vaccination to slaughter		
Trading partner	Not accepted	
acceptance of		
regionalization with		
stamping-out or		
vaccination to kill		
Trading partner	Accepted	
acceptance of		
regionalization with		
vaccination to slaughter		
or vaccination to live		
Assessments and	It is likely that a control strategy	
economic analysis of	with stamping out will lead to	
competing control	significantly higher economic losses	
strategies	or longer duration of the outbreak	
Premises Specific Considerations		
What zone is the premises in?	N/A	
Is producer complying with	N/A	
appropriate plan(s) (SFS)?		
Movement controls in place?	N/A	
Identification system in place?	N/A	
Size of farm	N/A	
Crew available/ trained to vaccinate?	N/A	
▼		

Table 1.2 Outlines additional factors that may be considered in determining the appropriate FMD vaccination strategy (likely protective emergency vaccination) in California when an outbreak is not identified in the state, but the state has determined there is a significant threat of disease introduction.

Factor or criterion supporting the response strategy	Answers supporting trigger of protective emergency FMD vaccination (or vax other strategy)	California incident specific planning (to be completed during outbreak response)
Movement/Trace Information	Information indicating recent susceptible species movement from affected area to California within the incubation period	
Location of Outbreak	Affected area considered a transportation hub where widespread susceptible animal movements throughout the country are expected	
Stop Movement Orders	Delayed quarantine and stop movement orders in affected areas and/or public is not complying with stop movement in affected areas	
Level of movements routinely expected between the outbreak location and California	Moderate level of fairly regular/routine movements	
% of containment of the outbreak threat	Disease continues to spread; is widespread; Control Areas continue to grow	

Process

The Unified ICs will work with the Operations, Planning and Epidemiology Sections to determine and recommend appropriate vaccination zones in the event of an FMD outbreak, and reevaluate these designations as needed throughout the outbreak based on the epidemiological situation. The Disease Reporting Officer will assign appropriate premises designations to each premises with susceptible species according to their location within the established zones, including identification of those premises targeted for vaccination using the USDA FAD PReP Guidance Overview of Emergency Vaccination. The State Veterinarian will approve all Control Areas and zones established throughout the incident unless this activity is specifically delegated to the Incident Commander(s) through a written Delegation of Authority (see Attachment 6 – Example State Veterinarian Delegation of Authority). Zones and Areas will be established using the USDA FAD PReP Guidance. Maps for the Incident Management Team (IMT) use containing geographic polygons depicting zones/areas will include describable boundaries enabling the IMT to clearly determine which premises fall within and outside the boundaries. The boundaries of an Area Quarantine, along with the clearly defined and describable boundaries will be published for public distribution, as required by statute. Enforcement of stop movement and vaccination activities within Control Areas and zones will occur through issuing individual or Area Quarantine Notices. IMT Public Information Officers will be responsible for messaging to the public regarding zones and areas. Social media and the CDFA website will be used to keep constituents informed. CDFA will conduct townhall style meetings and regular

conference calls with impacted producers and supporting industry officials to keep them informed of SFS requirements, zone information, quarantines, biosecurity recommendations, and vaccination campaign information. Quarantine enforcement will be delegated to the Unified Incident Commanders. Law Enforcement coordination,

using CDFA Investigator classifications, may be required and activation of supporting law enforcement agencies, through request to the Cal OES Region or establishing an MOU, is expected.

In the interim period from the request for vaccine until the vaccine is received by the California UC IMT, the IMT will assign personnel to contact all commercial operations slated for vaccine to validate on-farm staff available to vaccinate, adequate cold storage, and to validate head counts. This information will be shared with the IMT Logistics Section to ensure adequate supplies are dispatched to each farm.

FMD Vaccine Strategy Assessment When Vaccine Supply is Limited

The FMD Coordination Group, in conjunction with the UC IMT, will determine if the allocated vaccine will allow the state's vaccination strategy to be implemented. If the number of doses available to California is insufficient to implement the selected primary vaccination strategy, the UC IMT/FMD Coordination Group may consider an alternative strategy or may shift to focusing on protecting "high value" animals. High value animals will likely include breeding stock of high genetic value. Vaccinating these animals will result in them being sero-positive for FMD for life. If this impacts their value, that must be considered in the strategy shift. If this fallback strategy cannot be effectively applied due to limited vaccine allocated, the UC IMT/FMD Coordination Group may consider another alternative strategy or may decide to hold the vaccine and focus on depopulating infected and at-risk animals to contain the disease.

As the universe of operations needing vaccination is reviewed, operations considered low priority for vaccination (i.e., low risk of infection or transmission) may be temporarily bypassed. Examples of low priority operations may include producers with no infrastructure to support vaccination and/or no personnel to support vaccination, and cow-calf operations where there is little to no off-site movement and geographic isolation of animals. In these cases, as the vaccination of higher priority operations is concluded, these low priority operations may fall into a queue to receive vaccination.

Vaccine Receiving, Staging, and Distribution

This Section describes how vaccine be will stored, handled, and transported from receipt by the state to administration in the animal. It specifies who is responsible for maintaining proper storage temperatures⁴, and how chain of custody for the vaccine will be maintained and documented. It also describes the disposal plan for expired, temperature-abused, or otherwise unusable vaccine.

California will employ vaccine distribution strategies to deploy vaccine to individual premises. All FMD vaccine distribution strategies include assigning an on-site validator, a member of the UC IMT, may include contractors, private practitioners hired for the incident, or other gov't agency mutual aid. who is responsible for overseeing the vaccination process on the individual premises. On-farm animal handling personnel will be used whenever available to implement the actual animal vaccinations and record keeping process. Private practitioners may also be used in vaccine delivery and implementing animal vaccinations. This will allow fewer incident personnel on the premises which will help to reduce the resources required for vaccinations and reduce biosecurity risks. This plan recognizes three (3) vaccine distribution strategies. The UC IMT may employ any combination of these strategies in order to execute an effective vaccination campaign.

Considerations for all three distribution strategies


Outreach and education to farm personnel/owners is essential to ensure they understand biosecurity requirements in the face of a disease outbreak. Premises specific Secure Food Supply (SFS) Plans will be mandated to be activated on premises that fall within a Control Area, as well as on any premises that is targeted for vaccination. Any deliveries to the premises must not come onto the property unless absolutely necessary and then the vehicle should undergo cleaning and disinfection per the requirements outlined within the premises SFS Plan. Per the SFS Plan, vehicle disinfection stations and signage are needed around the premises to limit access.

- 1. Third Party Logistics Provider Vaccine Distribution Strategy (see figure 1 FMD Vaccine Distribution 3 PL Workflow)
 - a) The National Veterinary Stockpile contractors will deliver the vaccine to the UC IMT vaccine cold storage warehouse which may be managed by a third party logistics provider (3PL); ancillary vaccination supplies may also be delivered to the 3PL warehouse for receipt, staging, inventory, repacking, and distribution.

⁴ Refer to the NVS Planning Guide for Federal, State, Tribe, and Territory Officials, Section 6 for guidance on handling vaccine. In general, inactivated FMD vaccines must be maintained within a temperature range of 2°C-8°C

- b) CDFA may contract a 3PL, such as MWI Veterinary Suppliers or other related business, to serve as the UC IMT vaccine cold storage warehouse. The 3PL is already set up for inventory control, cold storage, bar code tracking, accountability, efficient repacking, and distribution. CDFA has visited the MWI facility in Tulare, California and the company has indicated a willingness to help in the event of an outbreak.
 - I. The UC IMT may station logistics section personnel at that the 3PL location to oversee the vaccine handling and serve as a liaison between the UC IMT and the cold storage facility.
 - II. The 3 PL will receive orders for vaccine and ancillary supplies from the UC IMT Logistics. The 3PL will either send the orders to the specific farm by courier or prepare the order for pick up by a member of the UC IMT for delivery to the specified farm. The 3PL may have existing relationships with commercial transport delivery companies that have demonstrated reliable delivery service in the past. This commercial transport option maybe considered for delivery to the farm perimeter if chain of custody, vaccine product security, and biosecurity concerns can be mitigated. If commercial transport is not an option, the UC IMT will establish a courier system for vaccine deliveries to premises.

Figure 1 CDFA FMD Vaccine Distribution Workflow 3PL



- 2. FMD Vaccination Workflow Private Veterinarian (See figure #3 FMD Vaccine Distribution Workflow Private Veterinarian below)
 - a) Within this strategy, the Incident Management Team would staff and oversee the vaccine storage, inventory, and distribution after receiving from NVSL.
 - b) This is a lesser preferred option because CDFA does not have warehouse trained personnel, nor the required equipment to handle the cold storage, inventory, repacking, and distribution of the product.

On-Site Validator: An Incident responder deployed to a premises to represent the UC IMT and oversee the vaccine delivery, chain of custody, cold chain monitoring, animal vaccination, and ID collection. Accredited veterinarians, Extension Agents, and other just-in-time resources, such as those requested through the State Operations Center, may be used to fill these roles. The IMT Finance Section may need to hire these personnel as seasonal employees or limited terms in or to appropriately compensate them. Government contractors or temp agency employees may also be considered.





Figure 2 CDFA FMD Vaccine Distribution Workflow Private Veterinarian

- **3. FMD Vaccination Workflow POD** (see figure 2 FMD Vaccine Distribution Workflow POD below)
 - a) This option is not preferred as it requires careful consideration of biosecurity mitigations. Options such as drive through pick-up with vehicle washing into and out of the point of distribution location should be employed. If adequate biosecurity mitigations are not possible, this strategy should not be employed.
 - b) For this strategy, the third-party logistics vendor would deliver the vaccine (and supplies) packaged for individual farms to a point of distribution (POD) site. Options for POD locations could be Ag Commissioners offices, UC Extension Offices, fairgrounds, or other regionally located sites.
 - c) Herd owners or their designees would come to the POD to pick-up their herd vaccines and supplies.
 - d) This option may only be considered in remote areas, such as areas that have hard to find addresses with limited access roads for delivery drivers.
 - e) Chain of custody must be carefully considered when having farm personnel pick up the vaccines; if vaccine security and chain of custody is an issue, may consider only allowing the premises/animal owners to pick up vaccine.
 - f) Drivers returning to the farm must employ careful biosecurity, ensuring vehicle washing and disinfection prior to entering the premises. If the driver can avoid driving onto the premises, the driver should contact the farm personnel to come to the premises perimeter to pick up the vaccine and supplies so that the driver does not come onto the premises.
 - g) In the timeframe between requesting vaccine and receiving vaccine, the UC IMT will work with producers to implement Secure Food Supply Plans and prepare selected premises for vaccination.



Vaccination Administration

This Section describes who is authorized to administer the vaccine, and how vaccination will be overseen and documented. In addition, it should present estimates for the vaccination rates (head/hour) and optimal vaccination crew size for different species and types of operations. Please see the <u>Pre-Vaccination Checklist</u> for an overview of tasks and responsibilities from the vaccine request through implementation of animal vaccinations.

In the timeframe between requesting vaccine and receiving vaccine, the UC IMT will contact premises targeted for vaccination to assess their readiness for vaccine. This includes gathering essential information such as validating the premises delivery address, primary contact and primary contact's phone number(s), email address, Social Media account (if preferred for alternate form of communication), animal species on premises, numbers of animals by species, animal ID system in use, and animal owner information. The UC IMT will validate if the premises has the ability to implement the vaccination and all ID application requirements with current in-house/on-farm personnel or if the premises will need an additional "Vaccination Team" of 4 to 6 outside personnel to assist with vaccinations. The UC IMT will use this information to prepare individual premises vaccine orders to be sent to the 3PL for fulfillment and distribution using the UC IMT's selected strategy.

Initially, the state will attempt to access and utilize on-farm personnel to implement the state's vaccination strategy for dairy and other bovine premises that maintain a cadre of staff, if they have the appropriate experience and skill. <u>Animal vaccination guidance</u> will be provided to each premises by the Operations Section On-site Validator. If the farm cannot provide appropriate and/or enough vaccination personnel, the state will attempt to use commercial custom vaccination teams or government/contractor vaccination teams to supplement farm resources. It may be necessary to request aid from other state and local agencies through the use of the Standardized Emergency Management System and the State Operations Center Mission Resource Tasking process.

Commercial vaccination teams routinely vaccinate at rates approaching 400 head per hour; however, if vaccinated animals need to be physically tagged, this maximum rate will likely drop to 150 to 200 head per hour. Custom vaccination teams typically consist of four to five members: one or two chute side, and two to three handlers. To facilitate the operation of these custom teams, the state will supply personnel to handle the vaccinate-related documentation. These personnel will most likely consist of local Animal Health staff not otherwise engaged in the response

The state will develop contingency plans to provide vaccination assistance to producers that do not have any internal capacity, and when commercial crews cannot be used/hired by the state. In these instances, documentation may be as challenging as the vaccination of animals in the field.

Supplies

This Section identifies critical vaccination supplies (see <u>FMD Vaccination SOP</u>) and how they will be obtained. The state will coordinate with industry and individual producers for equipment and supplies to support vaccination. If these sources cannot fill the state's needs, requests for supplies and equipment will be forwarded to state emergency management and/or the NVS.

- Syringes Multi-dose
- Needles 16gX1.5" hypodermic
- Sharps container
- Forceps to grip needle to change out
- Buckets for soap and water and/or chlorhexidine to clean syringe, as needed
- Animal restraint feed stanchions, chutes; temporary fencing
- Cooler
- Temperature data loggers to track cold chain
- Ear notchers
- Pink metal tags
- Tag applicator

- RFID Tags, wands, PDAs
- Laptop for MIM/EMRS access
- Mobile hotspot for internet access, where available
- PPE
- Foot baths
- Vehicle wash stations
- Vaccination SOP or handout with directions for vaccination administration and handling

Biosecurity

This Section describes what measures will be taken to ensure that vaccination activities do not spread FMD virus. Issues such as downtime, cleaning and disinfection of personnel and equipment, and other between-farm practices should be addressed.

SOP: General Biosecurity for all Incident Responders (Document in progress)

Documentation and Tracking

Recovery from an FMD outbreak is enabled by identification, surveillance, and tracking the disposition of vaccinated animals. These procedures must be detailed in a producer's <u>FMD Vaccinated Herd Management Plan</u>. To regain recognition as a country free of FMD, the United States must have an effective system for recording the movement and disposition of vaccinated animals.

This Section describes how vaccinates will be identified, what will be documented, and how records will be managed.

The description of vaccinate identification includes what forms of identification will be used, when and where identification will be applied, and who will apply the identification. In addition, this Section describes when individual identification is required, or under what circumstances groups of animals can be identified by lot.

Documentation of animal vaccination, at a minimum, will include a description of the vaccinated animals, their location, and vaccination date. In addition, this Section identifies who is responsible for this documentation, and where and how the records will be managed and maintained.

During the time between when vaccine is requested and when it is received by the UC IMT, the UC IMT will deliver RFID tags and wands to those premises designated for vaccination who do not currently use electronic ID and require the animal owner to apply the tags prior to receiving vaccine. This will enable faster and more efficient animal ID on vaccination day. If technology is a limiting factor, ear notching or other

permanent marking may be used, depending on the species, to indicate vaccinated animals in order to expedite vaccinations. These marked animals will have official ID recorded before the booster vaccine is given.

If vaccinates move individually, each vaccinate will be tagged/identified. If they can move as a group (e.g., pens of cattle in a feedlot), then the group will be tracked as a lot of cattle. As time and availability of resources allow, and if a vaccinate group has not been harvested or euthanized, the individual vaccinates will be tagged.

Critical information to be collected for vaccinated animals or lots/groups of animals:

- Premises Identification Number.
- Location of where vaccine is injected on each animal.
- Date of vaccination(s) (each time).
- Tag number (individual animal tracking), pen number for lots/groups of animals vaccinated, and the number of animals vaccinated and the total number of animals in the lot/group.

Vaccinates will be tracked from the time they are vaccinated until they are harvested, depopulated, or die of natural causes.

Producers wanting to move vaccinated animals off the premises will need to obtain a permit from the state, prior to moving them off the operation. Animal Health Branch mitigation section staff will receive and track information regarding vaccinates after the IMT is demobilized.

ATTACHMENT I:

EMERGENCY FMD VACCINATION AUTHORIZATION AND REQUEST FORM

Emergency FMD Vaccine Authorization and Request

The SAHO authorizes the use of FMD vaccine as part of the emergency response to an outbreak of FMD in the State (or for the Tribe) of ______.

The State requests _____ doses which will be administered between _____ (date) and ______ (date), according to the attached Emergency Vaccination Plan.

The name and contact information of the person authorized to receive the vaccine from National Veterinary Stockpile is ______

	Signatures	
State Animal Health Official:		
Signature:	Date:	
□VS Incident Commander or □V	S District Director/Area Veterinar	ian-In-Charge:
Signature:	Date:	
VS Deputy Administrator:		
Signature:	Date:	
CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY FMD VACCINATI	ION PLAN (DRAFT)	Page 26

ATTACHMENT 2:

FMD VACCINATION HERD MANAGEMENT PLAN

FMD Vaccination Herd Management Plan

Agreement to Vaccinate and Procedures Required Following Vaccination with FMD Vaccine

Premises Information

Premises ID			
County			
	Name		
Premises	Address		
Owner	Phone number		
	папре		
	Name		
Business	Address		
Owner	Phone		
	number		
	Name		
Contact	Address		
Person	Phone		
	number		
		Name	Phone
Animal Owners (attach list if necessary)			
Federal or	Name		
State Official Point of	Phone number		
Contact	number		

Signatures

Owner/Operator:	
Signature:	Date:
□VS Incident Commander or □Vs District Direc	tor/Area Veterinarian-In-Charge:
Signature:	Date:
□State Incident Commander or □State Veterina	arian:
Signature:	Date:
This is a written herd management agreement d Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and P (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) and (<i>In</i> State" or "State") with input from <i>owner and/or premises owner</i>). This herd will be (<i>Insert name of State</i>)	Plant Health Inspection Service <i>sert State initials</i>) (hereafter, "the (<i>Insert herd</i> handled in accordance with the _
	eafter, "the Herd Owner"), to receive SDA APHIS VS or the State, to on the premises, and to maintain <i>herd owner and/or premises owner</i>)
may request modifications to these procedures a or State Official Point of Contact. The procedure	

effect until all vaccinated animals die or are removed from the premises, or until such time as USDA APHIS VS and the State approve modifications to this agreement.

If USDA APHIS VS and the State determine that the Herd Owner has not met the responsibilities of this agreement, the State will quarantine the herd to further restrict the movement of livestock on or off the premises until such time as the owner becomes compliant with the procedures. Further, if the Herd Owner fails to carry out the responsibilities of this agreement, USDA APHIS VS and the State may deem the Herd Owner ineligible to receive indemnity payments related to FMD infection.

Animal inventory

The term *program animals*, as defined for the purpose of this document, includes cattle, goats, sheep, swine, bison and captive cervids.

Inventory of Program Animals on (date):			
		Subject to vaccination	
Туре	Number of animals	Yes	No
Cattle			
Goats			
Sheep			
Swine			
Bison			
Captive cervids			

Herd Owner Responsibilities

Biosecurity

• The Herd Owner has a written operation-specific biosecurity plan and implements the biosecurity plan continuously.

Movement Control

- The Herd Owner will maintain animal enclosures in a condition so as to prevent the escape of program animals at all times. If any vaccinated animal escapes from the premises, the Herd Owner must report the escape to USDA APHIS VS or the State.
- The Herd Owner will not add to or remove from the premises any program animals except under the conditions specified by a movement permit approved by the State.

Vaccination procedures

• The Herd Owner will vaccinate all program animals on the premises according to the USDA APHIS VS and State policy for FMD vaccination administration.

The Herd Owner will notify USDA APHIS VS or the State promptly if the Herd Owner is unable to administer vaccine to all program animals on the premises according to the policy.

- The Herd Owner will document vaccination of any animal on the premises using the vaccination record system designated by USDA APHIS VS and the State. The herd owner will review each vaccination record and certify that the information is correct.
- The Herd Owner will report immediately any vaccine-associated adverse events, such as illness, injury, or death, to USDA APHIS VS or the State.

Identification and documentation requirements

- The Herd Owner will permanently identify and keep records of each vaccinated animal until it dies or leaves the premises, according to USDA APHIS VS and State FMD vaccinate identification policy and procedures.
- The Herd Owner will permanently identify any vaccinated animals born on the premises and report natural herd additions annually to USDA APHIS VS for the duration of the use of FMD vaccination and the life of vaccinated animals.
- The Herd Owner will report the death of any vaccinated animal to USDA APHIS VS or the State as soon as possible.

Oversight and compliance

• The Herd Owner shall allow USDA APHIS VS or State personnel to enter the premises and inspect vaccinated animals and documents for the purpose of verifying compliance with provisions of the vaccination agreement. Inspections may occur throughout the active use of FMD vaccine as well as after the FMD Outbreak is concluded. Records inspection may be required to prove compliance with OIE guidelines in order to regain disease freedom designation or to re-open trade with international partners.

ATTACHMENT 3:

PRE-VACCINATION CHECKLIST

	Task	Responsible Party
1.	Decision to request vaccine for potential use in outbreak response management	Agency Administrator/ MAC Group
2.	Design of a responsive vaccination plan specific to the incident	Planning Section
3.	Approve Vaccination Plan for implementation: Decision to implement a responsive vaccination program	Agency Administrator/ MAC Group/
	according to the plan in #2	Incident Commander
4.	Establish the Vaccination Zone identified by the plan	Planning Section
5.	Prepare Official Request for Vaccine and other NVS assets	Planning Section
6.	Submit Official Request for Vaccine to USDA	Agency Administrator/ MAC Group
7.	Send out producer vaccination notification message (See <u>sample producer message</u>)	Public Information Officer
8.	Validate premises data in the vaccination zone (Premises Pre-Visit Forms/Site Visits)	Operations Section
9.	Determine premises requiring gov't vaccination teams; assemble and assign teams	Operations Section
10.	Prepare to receive NVS assets (Set-up Incident warehouse for PPE and other supplies)	Logistics Section
11.	Execute vaccine cold storage third party logistics (3PL) vendor contract	Logistics and Finance Sections
12.	Provide 3PL vendor specific number of required validated temperature containers to precondition (24	Logistics Section
	hours in advance of shipment)	
13.	Request to activate Private Practitioners (Specify Incident Role)	Operations Section
14.	Activate private practitioners	Logistics Section
15.	Establish a mechanism to pay private practitioners (NAHERC?)	Finance Section
16.	Prepare and submit individual premises vaccine and supply orders to Logistics Section	Operations Section
17.	Receive bulk vaccine shipment status from NVS	Logistics Section
18.	Provide 3PL with details on bulk vaccine shipment information (ETA, Pallet Specs)	Logistics Section
19.	Provide 3PL with instructions/orders for breaking down bulk vaccine into individual farm deliveries	Logistics Section
20.	Prepare/process any MOUs or other agreement with livestock owners to enable vaccination	Finance Section
21.	Prepare/process agreements relating to regional points of distribution (PODs) {venue, staffing}	Finance Section
22.	Activate and oversee set-up and staffing for vaccine PODs	Logistics Section
23.	Deploy NVS cold chain maintenance assets (refrigeration units), as needed to vaccine PODs	Logistics Section
24.	Provide 3PL instructions for delivering farm packages to PODs; specify which individual packages are to	Logistics Section
	be delivered to which POD	
25.	Prepare and launch vaccine distribution media notification to producers to pick up at POD	Public Information Officer
26.	Monitor POD vaccine pick-up to identify any missed premises	Logistics Section
27.	Implement contingency gov't vaccination teams for premises not picking up vaccine at POD	Operations Section

ATTACHMENT 4:

FMD VACCINATION SOP

FMD VACCINATION SOP

The following is the SOP for vaccination of cattle for FMD

Materials required

Vaccine



- Vaccine should be acquired from the MWI distribution center Visalia.
- Vaccine should be kept cold and out of direct sunlight such as provided by a cooler.

Syringes



- Multi dose syringes provided when picking up vaccine.
- Follow manufacturer's directions for assembly

Needles



• 16g x 1.5 inch hypodermic needles supplied with vaccine

Sharps container



• Sharps container for proper disposal of used needles

Preparation

Needle / Syringe assembly (insert picture of assembly)

• The needle is contained within a plastic needle cap and a white or clear hub cap.



• Carefully remove the small clear plastic cap by twisting each end of the assembly.



• Holding the plastic cap with the now exposed needle hub and insert onto the gun'stip, twisting to ensure a firm seat.

Syringe filling (insert picture(s) of steps)

- Pull the gray plastic needle cap from the needle.
- Holding the needle tipped syringe gun in one hand, carefully place the vaccine vial's rubber top onto the needle's sharp end and insert.
- Draw the required amount of vaccine from the vial.
- Place any remaining vaccine back into the storage cooler for later use.

Vaccination

Animal restraint (insert picture(s) of examples



• Safe, rapid, effective vaccination requires proper animal restraint

Injection

- Confirm that the gun used is dispensing 2cc. If using a variable volumegun, adjust for 2cc.
- With the needle tipped syringe gun perpendicular to the animal's neck (most accepted site according to Beef Quality Assurance), quickly plunge the entire needle through the skin and into the underlying muscle, squeezing the gun's handle to dispense **2cc of vaccine** and then withdraw the gun.



- Change needles after 10-20 injections are administered. Carefully replace the gray plastic cap onto the needle. Twist the cap and needle to remove from the gun. Sometimes needle removal will require forceps to grip and break free. Dispose of used needles into a sharps container.
- Replace with a fresh needle and continue vaccinating

In field vaccine handling

Vaccine must be refrigerated.

• When being administered, vaccine not currently being used must be stored in a covered cooler with ice packs.

Animal identification

- RFID
- Ear notch

Observation

Anaphylaxis

Clean-up

Syringe cleansing

• Syringes must be cleaned with hot water, soap or a disinfectant such as chlorhexidine and thoroughly rinsed and dried prior to next use.

ATTACHMENT 5:

CALIFORNIA STATE VETERINARIAN DELEGATON OF AUTHORITY

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY [Name of Disease Incident]

This delegation applies to statewide actions necessary to carry out California Department of Food and Agriculture's (CDFA) legal and jurisdictional authorities relating to the [Named Disease/Official Name of Incident & Year] eradication.

This incident is currently located in [Name the CA Counties] predominantly in [Northern, Central, Southern] California (CA).

[Name of Incoming Incident Commander] is assigned the position of [Incident Commander (IC) or Area Commander (AC)] on the [Named Disease/Official Name of Incident & Year]. The [IC/ AC] has full authority and responsibility for managing the Incident activities within the framework of law, CDFA Agency policy, the direction provided in this Delegation of Authority, the applicable disease response plans, and the Incident Management Team (IMT) briefing.

As the current appointed California State Veterinarian, I hereby delegate the following authorities and have outlined expectations and Incident priorities as indicated by the checked boxes below. The [IC/AC] is accountable to the CDFA Agency Administrator or her/his designee to protect the health of the animals of California for the sake of protecting the food supply and the public health of the citizens of California.

Delegated Authorities:

California Food and Agriculture Code (FAC):

Division 5. Animal and Poultry Quarantine and Pest Control

Part 1. Diseased Animals and Poultry

Chapter 3. Animal Quarantine [9501-9702]

- Article 1. Definitions [9501-9503]
- Article 2. Inspections [9531-9532]
 - 9531. (Authority to enter premises & facilities to investigate)
 - <u>9532.</u> (Authority is not exclusive, local inspectors maintain powers to inspect animals)
- Article 3. Establishment of Quarantine [9561-9574]
 - 9561. (Authority to Quarantine & Police (FAC): 9562)
 - 9562. (a) (Authority to Quarantine for public/animal health protection)
 - (b) (1) (Authority to Quarantine due to emergencies)
 - (2) (Authority to Quarantine animal product)
 - (3) (Authority to destroy/move/segregate/isolate animal product or animals)

- <u>9563.</u> (Authority to issue "Movement Permits" through CA State Veterinarian)
- <u>9564.</u> (Authority to Quarantine based on geographic boundaries)
- 9569. Additional Authority to:
 - (a) (Restrict movement of vehicles/products/people)
 - (b) (Restrict vehicular movement within Quarantine Zone to roadways)
 - (c) (Detain animals for inspection within Quarantine Zone)
 - (d) (Destroy contaminated animals & property)
 - (e) (Dispose of contaminated carcass and hides of animals)
 - (f) (Clean and disinfect contaminated premises or property)
- <u>9570.</u> (Authority to dictate restrictions on importation of animals/animal products/property into CA)
- <u>9573.</u> (Prohibition of Quarantine imposition by a city/county on each other)
- <u>9574.</u> (Monetary penalties for violation through Attorney General's Office)

Support (FAC) to Delegated Authorities:

Chapter 3. Animal Quarantine [9501-9702]

- Article 4. Compensable Destruction of Diseased Animals [9591-9595] (Appraisal and Indemnity)
- Article 7. Interagency Cooperation [9671-9674]
 - (Joint exercise of powers, CDFA may have full control of eradication activities, coordination with states with same disease outbreak, counties treasuries may be transferred to CDFA for eradication activities)
- Article 8. Violation [9691-9702] (Wording to support Quarantine Authority)

California Food and Agriculture Code of Regulations (CCR):

Title 3. Food and Agriculture

Division 2. Animal Industry

Chapter 7. Control of Diseased Animals

Article 3. Quarantine, sections [1301-1301.9.]

- <u>1301.</u> Definitions (as used in the Article)
- <u>1301.1.</u> Notice of Required Action (hold/move/segregate/isolate/treat/ destroy/refuse entry)
- <u>1301.4.</u> Epidemiological Investigation (minimum requirements)
- <u>1301.5.</u> Sample Collection (procedures and constraints)

Support (CCR) to Delegated Authorities:

Chapter 2. Livestock Disease Control (Animal Quarantine)

Article 13. Interstate Movement of Poultry (Refs & Annos)

821. Definitions (as used in the article)

821.1. General Requirements (non-specific requirements)

821.2. Certificate of Veterinary Inspection (requirements of the form)

821.4. Requirements for Entry of Poultry (disease specific and paperwork)

See Attachment For Full Text:

Authorities of California State Veterinarian

California Department of Food and Agriculture

California Food and Agriculture Code (FAC)

&

California Code of Regulations (CCR)

Constraints:

- Establishment of any Regional Quarantine must be approved by the California State Veterinarian.
- □ All euthanasia methods must be approved by the California State Veterinarian.
- □ County agreements for cooperative eradication efforts must be approved by the California State Veterinarian.
- □ Designated State Veterinarian representatives pursuant to delegated quarantine authority and defined in 1301(f) must be approved by the California State Veterinarian.
- Ensure personnel perform work activities related to the response in a manner that is compliant with California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) and the State of California Code of Regulations (CCR).
- □ The State of California acquisition and cost accounting systems must be used to ensure effective legal purchase of resources. Authorization for purchase of Incident related resources will be exclusively through Incident Logistics Section. Authorization will be through pre-approved CDFA personnel whom have been awarded "Delegation of Authority" to purchase using CDFA funds.
- □ Disposal of waste water, material, animal products, and animal carcasses must be in compliance with all applicable State of California and Federal laws.
- □ Use and disposal of pesticides including disinfectants must be in compliance with all applicable State of California and Federal laws.

Expectations:

1. <u>Resource Management:</u>

- □ Maintain a rotation schedule for response personnel that will allow for concurrent disease control, elimination, surveillance, outreach, movement and permitting and capacity to respond to new cases until completion of objectives.
- □ When demobilizing the IMT, ensure a formal transfer of command is completed. When transitioning the remaining workload back to the Animal Health Branch (AHB) District, the outgoing IC must ensure a staff person from the AHB District is assigned to continue the essential Incident functions after the (Incident Command) ICP is dissolved.
- □ Maintain adequate security and accountability to prevent fraud and theft of government resources.

2. Data Management:

- □ Only Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) will be used as the incident data base of record used to track information generated by the incident.
- □ The IC will establish and maintain proper internal and external information dissemination per California Animal Health Emergency Management System (CAHEMS) Incident Command System (ICS) Position Manuals, including Incident Action Plans, Situation Reports, epidemiology reports, media reports and conference calls.

3. Animal Diseases Strategy:

- □ The IC [is/is not] authorized to permit and manage vaccination.
- Incident Management Activities will be guided by CAHEMS [Disease] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Disease Response Plans. Any procedural conflicts should be brought to the CDFA Agency Administrator for resolution. Additional guidance will be referenced through the most current [Species] Eradication Universal Methods and Rules (UM&R), CA [Disease] Directives, and applicable USDA Foreign Animal Disease Plans.

4. <u>Reporting Requirements:</u>

- □ A Unified Incident Situation Report will be generated at intervals established by Agency Administrators.
- □ The IC will establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) and ensure all external communications are coordinated through the JIC.
- □ The IC will ensure key Incident personnel participate in Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) conference calls, JIC briefings, and other critical communications as established by Agency Administrator.

Priorities:

- Detect, control and eliminate _____ disease from__
- □ Preserve Industry continuity of business using animal movement guidelines outlined within the Secure Food Supply Plan (see CAHEMS toolkit).
- □ Maximize safety of responders and public.
- $\hfill\square$ Operate in compliance with the laws of California.
- □ Protect and safeguard life and property and minimize damage to livestock and farm investments.
- □ Maximize the protection of the environment, ecologically sensitive areas, and waterways.

[Name, Title of Incoming IC/AC] will represent me on any occasion that I am not immediately available. This authority is effective: [mm/dd/yyyy; military time 0000], and will remain in effect until a transfer of command, this delegation is revoked, or the ICP is demobilized by the Agency Administrator.

[Name, Title] Commander California State Veterinarian Incident California Department of Food

and Agriculture

Prepared: [mm/dd/yyyy; military time: 0000]

ATTACHMENT 6:

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

List of Abbreviations

AHB	Animal Health Branch
APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
AVIC	Area Veterinarian in Charge
CDFA	California Department of Food and Agriculture
DD	District Director
EPRS	Emergency Preparedness and Response Section
FAD	Foreign Animal Disease
FMD	Foot-and-Mouth Disease
ICG	Incident Coordination Group
IMT	Incident Management Team
MAC	Multi-Agency Coordination
NTEP	National Training and Exercise Program
NVS	National Veterinary Stockpile
SAHO	State Animal Health Official
U.S.	United States
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
VS	Veterinary Services